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Abstract 
To disentangle the relations between standards, innovation and competition, this 
paper examined the processes and effects of standardization in Japanese firms. The 
realities of their activities were provided by a postal questionnaire sent to progressive 
large firms in Japanese industries. 
    Overall, although Japanese firms have sufficiently understood the significance of 
increased standardization, they don’t always actively and strategically involve in the 
standardization process. The conclusion may be derived from the respondents’ 
evaluations that 1) the effects of standardization are less likely to be profitable; 2) 
formal standard setting organizations are not always an effective coordination 
mechanism of intellectual property rights; and 3) they don’t have a sufficient internal 
institution for standardization strategy. They are rather skeptical of particularly 
formal and semi-formal standardization processes. 
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Introduction 
    There is little doubt that R&D and innovations are the driving forces of a firm's 
growth and viability, and further, of industrial and economic development. Therefore, a 
great number of studies have examined the factors affecting R&D and innovations in a 
theoretical and/or empirical way. In particular recently, the role of standardization in 
innovation is receiving more interest from the viewpoint of both corporate strategy and 
public policy, since it may have a large influence on innovation and competition among 
firms.
    Doubts have been grown, and now are still growing over the competitiveness of 
Japanese industries. Their cost minimization as advantage has approached the limit 
for two reasons:  First, labor costs are still of the highest level in the world. Second, 
cost controls through “kaizen” and subcontracting are more difficult. As a result, even 
in the fields with competitiveness, their dominance has been or is being eroded by 
challenges from the world growth center. Now, the companies have a stronger 
preference for product innovation than for process innovation.  
The industries have still relatively larger capability to develop new technologies. 
But, larger technological capability may not be sufficient for revitalizing Japan’s 
industries, since it may not always lead to improved competitiveness and innovations. 
The situation may be called “Japan’s Paradox.” There may be barriers which prevent 
new inventions to transfer into innovation processes. Standardization, in particular 
global one, of invented new technologies is likely to be a key for solving the paradox. It 
is because standardization is expected to be able to facilitate efficiency and innovation. 
    Recently, the importance of technology standardization in competition is 
emphasized. To disentangle the relation between standards and innovation, it is 
important to examine the processes and effects of standardization. But, study is scarce 
which examines standardization strategies, in particular in Japanese firms, due to 
data restrictions. We don’t know the reality of their activities sufficiently.  
    In this paper, answers were provided largely by a postal questionnaire sent to 
progressive large firms in Japanese industries. This paper, which examines an overall 
feature of standardization strategy-makings, is a report from the on-going research 
project. The organization of the paper is as follows. The first section suggests the split 
type of standardization, which seems to be increasingly prevalent among Japanese 
firms. The discussion may be a priori and theoretical base for this empirical analysis. 
The second section describes the methodology of the paper, and examines some major 
features of Japanese standard performers. The third to fifth sections discuss the 
results from the questionnaire. And finally, there are conclusions and then suggestions 
for further research. Here, standard is defined as “standardized format”.  
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I  Patterns of Standardization: Split Type of Strategy 
I.1  Consensus-based Standardization 
     The fierce competition for dominant technology format, which was typically found 
in VTR and recently the new generation of DVD (Blue–Ray vs. HD-DVD), aroused 
increasing concern with standardization through inter–firm competition, which is 
usually called the “de facto standardization”. But, in fact, more standards have been 
formed through non–competition processes. The processes include a variety of 
cooperative forms such as “voluntary consensus” through formal or informal 
standard–setting organizations (SSOs) and “mandatory consensus” such as public 
regulations of safety, health, environments and fair trade (which are frequently of a 
“compliance” type). The two latter types are collectively called “consensus standards”. 
In fact, much of the key standardization activity in ICT sector is carried out by 
industry consortia and formal SSOs. But, it is noted that the consensus–building 
process frequently may include intense interactions among participant firms, which are 
just like competitive processes found in the de facto standardization. The definition of 
standards is used comparatively loosely, and therefore may be different among 
business persons depending on their business experiences. 
   Also, it is noted that most of firms always face any of various types of standards, 
implying that all firms should take into account standardization in all aspects of 
corporate strategy–making. In fact, firms to a certain extent understand the 
backgrounds where standardization is necessary. In particular, as suggested later, two 
factors are rather important; complicated technology structure of a product, and 
regulatory standards such as safety, health,  environment, and fair trade regulations 
which are usually called “social standards” (See Table 4). 
    The consensus is usually formed by joining newly–established or existing SSOs, 
business associations and other alliances. Recently, surging interest is in SSOs as 
patent coordination mechanism. It is attributable to the fact that many of new 
inventions frequently build on a complicated configuration of technologies and 
complementary assets. They may not only have innovation & efficiency–promoting 
effects, but also involve their specific antitrust concerns, since the consensus-building 
and consensus-implementing processes may include restricted competition. Therefore, 
standards are among policy agenda in both industrial development and competition 
policies. Put alternately, public policies may exert an influence on business 
standardization strategies. 
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I.2  Split Type of Standardization Strategy 
A distinction is usually drawn between product and process innovations and 
improvement (“kaizen”). In recent years, many firms tend to emphasize the importance 
of product innovation. In fact, most of the respondents in this survey suggest that 
product & service innovation (including product improvement) is overwhelmingly more 
important than process innovation & improvement (i.e., 92 out of 93 available 
responses). Product innovation is likely to involve more areas of technologies. 
    Firms frequently compete in certain areas of a product, and at the same time 
cooperate in other areas. A combination of cooperation and competition is sometimes 
called “co-opetition” (Nalebuff & Brandenburger [1996]). Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
[1996] suggest that firms frequently cooperate to create a new or bigger business “pie”, 
and win a larger share of the pie through competition. Such a hybrid behavior is 
possible in standardization process. In fact generally, there is scarcely the standard 
which governs most portions of a product. But, existing studies fail to look at the fact, 
and emphasize largely the types of standards and their timing in standardization. 
Recent standardization cases suggest the importance of “standardized areas” of a 
product. Therefore, the existing studies have not examined the areas of standardized 
technologies, and their effects on competition in an “end” product market.   
Thus, many progressive industries with patent-intensiveness are on the threshold 
of new types of cooperation. It is the “split” type of standardization. In general, 
standardization is likely to induce fierce competition through increasing 
homogenization of products, and then to declining profitability and competitiveness. 
For example, in electronics industries in Japan, before, comprehensive licensing and 
cross licensing agreements have been implemented, which have included both 
infrastructural and application technologies. The consequence was larger 
homogenization and standardization of a product, and then more fierce competition, in 
particular from overseas firms(1). Such situations might have a negative influence on 
the evaluation of effects of standardization strategies in Japanese firms, although the 
agreements frequently have led to expanded market. 
   One of the possible solutions for a firm is the “split” of a product between 
cooperative standardization area (non-competition area) and independent and 
competitively–differentiated area (competition area). Firms try to standardize the 
particular areas of a product (or service) to increase their competitive advantages 
                                                 
(1) They were combined with “modularization”. See for example Shintaku et al. [2006]. 
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through differentiation and discretion in other areas, and finally in the whole product. 
This solution is also of a type which is emphasized by EC as key of its 
competitiveness-promoting policy. 
As shown in Figure 1, firms strategically divide a product or a technology into the 
two areas: “competition area” for application technologies and “non–competition area” 
for platform (or basic) technologies. In the non-competition area, firms co-operate each 
other for standardization, while they emphasize individuality strategies such as 
differentiation and innovation in the competition area. The strategy suggests that 
firms may have areas which can be successfully standardized without losing 
competitiveness of differentiation in a product. For example, such behavior can be 
found in automobile, electronics and optical instruments sectors(2). In this survey?63 
out of 93 available responses (from various industry sectors) agree with the statement 
that “the ‘split’ strategy is of a preferable type”.
   Thus, the split strategy may be due to the possibility that standardization has 
ambivalent effects for firms. While firms can win the standardization benefits of both 
increased efficiency (for example, economies of scale from larger production of 
homogeneous product) and created or expanded markets, they may simultaneously 
reduce or lose the opportunity of gaining competitive advantages from individual 
differentiation and innovation. But, the split strategy may capture both benefits of 
standardization and differentiation. But in fact, there are many firms that don’t 
understand sufficiently the implications of the split strategy or the effects of 
standardization on competition area. 
 Now, we are interested in “how firms manage the split and interface between 
                                                 
(2) See Doi et al.[2008] and Doi et al.[2010] respectively for automobile and digital camera. 
Competition Area 
(Application Technology)
Non-Competition Area 
(Platform Technology) 
Figure 1 Split Model
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cooperation and competition in standardization process, or in the transfer processes of 
new inventions into standardization”. Then, intellectual property right(s) (IPR and 
IPRs) as protection may have a significant influence on standardization activity. And, 
as industrial economics and organizational economics suggest, standardization 
behavior is likely to depend on external and internal environments or relationships of a 
firm.
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Figure 2 Corporate Triangle?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????
?
  Figure 2 shows that firms formulate standardization activities under both the
internal (strategy, business process, managerial resources and organizational 
structure) and external (competition, competitors, market structure and public policies) 
environments. These relationships and in particular the relations between IPRs, 
standards and competition have not been sufficiently examined in a theoretical and 
empirical way. To analyze the effects of standardization on competition and innovation 
and then on economic welfare, the competitive impacts of the split type of behavior are 
necessary to be discussed.  
The above discussion is a theoretical development. Based on the discussion, the 
following main problems can be picked up: 
1) There are some major difficulties in application and implementation of IPRs. In 
particular, patent conflicts may be very important. One of the solutions for the 
conflicts is consensus standardization through various types of SSOs and public 
regulations.
2) But, there are several difficulties in consensus standardization process as well, 
Strategy 
Business Process
Organizational 
Structure 
Managerial
Resources 
Competition  ?
(External         
Environment) 
?? Competition 
? ? (External  
Environment) 
? ? ? ?
Internal Environment
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which are related to both internal environments of a company and the governance 
and management of SSOs. They are likely to have an influence on the evaluation of 
standardization effects. 
3) There are alternative solutions for very difficult coordination of patents in 
consensus building processes. Those difficulties and their solutions may have an 
influence on standardization processes. 
Whether the relationships derived from those broad problems were reflected and 
captured in the responses were discussed in this paper. 
II  The Methodology and Sample of Questionnaire 
    In general, as suggested earlier, standardization strategy may be determined 
under the interaction between the internal and external environments and business 
strategy. One of the possible determinants is the “internal management” of standards 
and intellectual property. A combination of questionnaire survey and field interview 
was utilized. The approaches include the questions on the internal institutions and 
evaluations of standardization(3).   
    The questionnaire was sent to heads of IPR units probably responsible for also 
standards in a sample of 447 IPR–conscious performers in April 2009. The firms were 
selected largely from the member of the Japan Intellectual Property Society and 
included some additional large firms.? Most of the sampled firms, who were listed in 
the stock exchanges, seemed to be “IP–conscious” in strategy-making. They have a 
special unit with full-time responsibility for IPR.   
    We received 93 effective responses until the end of April. Unfortunately the return 
rate, 21.0 percent is very low. Possibly, radically-declining business activity since fall 
2008 might have an influence on the return. 
    Table 1 shows the distribution by sector (i.e., 2-digit industry) of responses.? 69
percent of the responses are from the two “IPR-intensive” sectors of chemicals and 
machines (general machinery, electrical appliances, transport equipments and 
precision instruments). Other companies also are IPR-intensive. Many respondents 
suggested that their responses were the official statements of their companies. It 
should be noted that the industry classification does not always capture the business 
composition and diversification of a company precisely.  
                                                 
(3) The questionnaire-based studies are for example Blind et al.[2002] and Blind[2004] for European 
firms, and Striukova[2006] for major firms in the world. Also see JFEO[2008] for Japanese firms. 
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Table 1 Response Distribution by Indutry 
Industry Sector  No. of Firms Industry Sector         No. of Firms 
Food              2  Non-ferrous metals     4 
Fiber & textile             7  Metal products      4 
Pulp & papers      2  General machinery    12 
Chemicals            27  Electronical appliances    11 
Petroleum             0  Transport equipments       10 
Rubber              1           Precision instruments     4 
Clay and stone      3           Others              3 
Steels              3           Total             93 
There are some methodologies for answering questions. First, respondents were 
asked to rate the importance of several possible factors and statements to the decision, 
promotion and success of IPR and standard strategy. The questions were largely based 
on Blind et al.[2002], since the EC survey covered many general aspects in 
standardization processes(4). Also, comparison with EC findings was possible. In this 
survey, some Japan-specific questions were added.  
And, rating was in most cases on the three- to five-point scale of 1 to 5 (i.e., 5 : 
“very high”, 4: “high”, 3: “medium”, 2: “low”, and 1: “very low”), 1 to 4 (i.e., 4: “high”, 3: 
“medium”, 2: “low”, and 1: “very low”), and 1 to 3 (i.e., 3: “high”, 2: “medium”, 1: “low”).
Second, the "yes/no" type questions were provided for them. Finally, respondents were 
asked to select the contents which they think are most suitable for their own views. 
But, the number of responses is different from question to question, since some 
respondents were sometimes reluctant to reply to sensitive questions. 
Also, some face-to-face interviews were complementarily conducted. The target 
was 20 firms which were all in machines sector. From these methodologies, we may 
suggest the common understandings or evaluations, which are likely to be prevalent in 
the business world.   
III  Results from the Questionnaire: IPR Management  
    Now we will examine the results from the questionnaire in turn. The results are 
shown in Tables 2 to 10.  These tables show the number of respondents selecting a 
particular scale in response to questions, based on the rating of a scale of 1 to 5. The 
results for the yes/no type questions and others are shown in the text with no table. 
The tables show the mentions, their distributions and means. 
                                                 
(4) The EC survey (Blind et al.[2002], pp.216-218) does not publish detailed results, only summarizing 
major findings. In general, Europe is a front-runner of standard research.
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This section starts in Table 2 with the presentation of the results of the first 
question concerning the way for protecting and appropriating newly–invented 
technologies. At the beginning, it is important to understand IPR protections. Firms 
can protect their technologies by the use of any of alternative methods. Among possible 
methods are “Patents”, “Trademarks”, “Copyrights”, “Secrecy”, “Lead-time advantages”, 
“Customer relations management”, “Long–term contracts”, “Exclusive contracts with 
suppliers”, and so on. Firms were asked about the importance of those methods to 
protect new inventions. The results for the question are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Protection of Technologies 
 Protections                               Rating of Importance?         Mean 
                               very  low  medium  high  very   
low                        high 
                                1      2     3     4   5  
? Patents                             3      2     4    15  69      4.56 
? Trademarks                        2     15    28    21  27  3.60  
? Copyrights                       16    33    30    10   3  2.47 
? Secrecy                             2      7    27    25  30  3.81 
? Lead-time advantages  ?             3     5    23    36  25      3.82 
? Customer relations management      1    10    42    28  10      3.40 
? Long-term contracts                4    18    33    29   6      3.17 
? Exclusive contracts with suppliers     3    15     45    26   2      3.10 
? Complex product design             16    29     32     9   3      2.48 
? Embody intangible assets in product  15    22    31    18   4      2.71 
The respondents suggest that “patents” (mean mention rate – shortly mean score – 
4.56) are the most important protection in the sample. And “trademarks” (mean score 
3.60), “secrecy” (mean score 3.81) and “lead–time advantages” (mean score 3.82) are 
strategically important as well. In particular, patents have the greatest preference, 
which is rather different from the evidences found in US and Europe that patents are 
less effective than lead-time (or first-mover) advantages and secrecy (See for example 
Greenhalgh and Rogers [2010], pp.152-154 for US, and Blind et al.[2002], p.217 for EC). 
The difference may be due to the fact that most of the responses come from sectors with 
higher “patent premium”.   
Also, it is noted that non–patenting methods such as secrecy and lead-time 
advantages are very important, being consistent with the recent trend of declining 
patent applications among large firms(5). But, the “confidentiality-based” methods such 
                                                 
(5) One interviewee (in transport equipments) suggested that the company applied only “effective 
technologies” (called “effective patents”) which were “unavoidably essential for its rivals to 
manufacture and sell their end products”. The approach led to its decreased applications. He 
emphasized that the capability to develop an end product as well as new technologies was equally 
important. 
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as “customer relationship management” and “long-term contracts” unexpectedly does 
not have larger strategic value.  These findings are consistent with the results of Goto 
et al.[1996]’s survey conducted in 1995, and are very likely to reflect that the samples 
are in manufacturing sector. 
    Certainly, many samples (patent–intensive firms) tend to apply more patents, 
although difference among firms is large. The motives for patent application are the 
next important issue. The second question is concerned with the motives problem. The 
results for the question are shown in Table 3. The respondents were asked on the 
importance of ten possible motives. The responses suggest that “Protect own 
technologies from imitations” (mean score 4.59) and “Increase own company’s value”
(mean score 4.05) are very important, being followed by “Prevent patent infringement 
litigations” (mean score 3.96), “Impede rivals’ patenting strategies” (mean score 3.76), 
and “Improve inter-firm negotiations” (mean score 3.59). These results are only a 
confirmation of the traditional rationale of patent system. As the selected motives are 
overlapping each other in the contents, it can be concluded that the main motive is to 
protect own technologies from rivals, and keep or improve competitive advantages. 
Table 3 Motives to Apply for Patent 
? Motives                          Rating of Importance         Mean 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? very  low  medium  high  very 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? low                        high 
                                  1     2      3      4      5  
? Protect own technologies from imitation  2     2      2     20     66  4.59 
? Increase own company's value         3     1     18     36     34     4.05 
? Prevent patent infringement litigations   3     3     21   32     32  3.96 
? Impede rivals' patenting strategies       3     6     28   28     27  3.76 
? Improve inter-firm negotiations         2     9     33     29     19  3.59 
? Gain licensing revenues                  7    23     37     17      8  2.96 
? Gain a better bargaining position         6    32     37     11      4  2.72 
   in standard setting           
? Prevent rivals from integrating own      8    20    28      18     17  3.18 
   technologies in a formal standard  
? Improve own position in joint R&D       3    11     40     29      8  3.31 
? Improve the technological image         3    10     36     31     11  3.41 
   of a company                   
     
On the other hand, some motives relevant to standardization are less important 
than expected; “Gain licensing revenues”, “Gain a better bargaining position in 
standard setting”, and “Prevent rivals from integrating own technologies in a formal 
standard”. 
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    Finally, we are interested in evaluation about patent strategies of own firms. The 
question is “To which extent have your company’s patent policy (patenting and 
licensing) been successful?”. The result is: 3 responses for “very large” (scale 5), 22 for 
“large” (scale 4), 49 for “medium” (scale 3), 15 for “small” (scale 2), and 3 for “very 
small” (scale 1). Then, "scale 3" (i.e., "medium") outranks "scales 4 & 5" (i.e., “large” and 
“very large”) in mention. The samples with higher evaluation (= “very high” and “high”)
are 25 responses, and 53% (49 responses) of the samples selected “medium”. The mean 
mention rate of 3.07 reflects the distribution as well. 
    Thus, overall and bearing in mind the qualifications of the questionnaire survey, 
we can conclude that the persons have well understood the functions of patents, but 
that the effects are evaluated to be largely of a medium level.  Put alternately, they 
have small or medium perception of patents as strong strategic weapon. The conclusion 
is consistent with the accepted hypothesis that Japanese firms frequently do not 
establish the process to manage innovation.   
IV  Results from the Questionnaire: Standardization Management 
    This survey includes many questions. The results are examined in turn as follows.  
IV.1  Awareness of Strategic Importance of Standardization 
    First of all, we are interested in respondents’ awareness and understanding about 
the importance of standardization in strategy-makings. To capture and confirm an 
awareness among firms of the backgrounds promoting standardization, the 
respondents were asked to rate the importance of some possible statements. The 
statements are, 1) “A company has no capability to develop all relevant essential 
technologies”, 2) “A product is of a structure which integrates a greater number of 
different essential technologies, 3) “A market is not likely to be created and expanded 
due to plural competing formats”, and 4) “Regulatory standards concerning safety, 
health and environments are socially emphasized”. The result is shown in Table 4. 
Although they attached to each statement an above-“medium” level of importance 
(scales 3, 4 and 5), there is no remarkable common rating, since it was often "scale 3" 
(i.e., medium importance) or “scale 4” (i.e., more than medium) that received the 
largest number of mentions. Among them, the second (mean score 3.45) and forth 
(mean score 3.47) statements have a little high support. It should be noted that the 
responses may be affected by characteristics of relevant technologies such as 
“cumulative” and “combinative” technologies. In conclusion, many respondents 
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understand the implications from complicated technological structure of a product (i.e.,
ill influences from “patent thickets”) and increasing importance of “social standards” as 
driving forces of standardization. 
By the way, in particular, when own patents are involved in a “patent thicket”, a 
firm can not easily realize the effects. In electronics, essential technologies for their 
complete functionality are dispersed among many patent holders, and are owned by 
different patent holders. The fact suggests that there is a larger number of licensor and 
licensee and also of patent. As a result, individual patent holders can not successfully 
commercialize their own technologies independently. Many relevant firms must 
coordinate the dispersion of patents. The effects of patents are achieved through 
standardization processes as coordination mechanism. 
Table 4 Backgrounds Promoting Standardization 
?   Statements                     Rating of Importance ?       Mean 
    ? ? ? ?     very  low  medium  high  very ? ? ?
low                        high 
                                   1      2      3      4     5  
? A company has no capability to develop   3     22     23      20    7 3.08 
   all relevant essential technologies     
? A product is of a structure which         1     18     17      27   14 3.45 
   integrates a greater number of different      
   essential technologies                      
? A market is not likely to be created and   7     15     18      26   11 3.25 
  expanded due to plural competing       
  technologies                              
? Regulatory standards concerning         3     10     26      24   14 3.47 
   safety, health and environments are      
   socially emphasized                      
     
Standardization has always been a very controversial field of activity, since, as 
suggested earlier, standards do not only involve some economic benefits, but also at the 
same time reduce individuality and differentiation. As a result, the final effects of 
standardization vary from firm to firm because of two reasons. First, standardization 
may induce more competition through increasing homogenization of products, which is 
likely to have a positive or negative effect on individual profitability. Second, the final 
effect in a firm includes the profits of the “competition area” (which capture the 
“indirect” benefits of standardization, and therefore individual competitiveness) as well 
as the profits of “non–competition area” (which capture the “direct” benefits of 
standardization).  
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    Thus, evaluation of standardization effects may be expected to be different among 
firms with different competitiveness and market positions(6). Industrial organization 
studies have not worked less extensively on the empirical or quantitative assessment of 
standardization effects, in particular in Japan. It may be due to the unavailability of 
statistical information at a firm and industry level. 
    Now, we will refer to the qualitative evidence on the evaluation of standardization 
effects. The results are concerned largely with: 1) its effects on individual 
competitiveness and competitive advantage, 2) motives of joining standardization 
organizations, 3) barriers to standardization, and 4) internal systems for 
standardization. The results for the questions, shown in the following tables, are likely 
to reflect the possible evaluation by respondents of standardization effects. 
IV.2  Evaluation of Standardization Effects 
    The first issue is concerned with the evaluations on the effects of standardization 
on a company’s competitiveness in both the major (with largest sales currently) field 
and the growing field (as future growth base) in a company(7).  The results are 
revealed in Table 5 (? and ?). In the both fields, more than half of the respondents do 
not think that standards have or will have an influence on competitiveness; 48 
responses (out of 92 available samples in the major field) and 47 responses (out of 91 
available samples in the growing field) respectively agree with the evaluation that 
standardization benefits are low (scale 2) or very low (scale 1), suggesting that “there is 
a little or no relation between a company’s competitiveness and standards”. The 
findings are roughly in accordance to the results (which is not included in the table) 
from the evaluations on the effects of standardization on technological development for 
the ensuing years after standardization. 
                                                 
(6) For example, it is frequently said that the positive effects of standardization on firm profitability 
have disappeared within 2 or 3 years after standardization in many industries.
(7) Doi et al. [2010] suggest that in digital camera industry price-cost margin significantly increased 
after standardization, implying the possibility of profits-raising effect through market expansion 
and cost reduction by standardization. Similar effects can be found in other industries as well. On 
the contrary, many industries are found to have incurred profit reduction due to more fierce 
competition through standardization. Therefore, the effect of standardization may be ambivalent, 
depending on market structure and competition. 
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Table 5 Evaluation on Standardization Effects 
 Problems                         Standardization Benefits           Mean    No 
                     very low  low  medium  high  very high         response 
                         1      2     3    4    5   
? General View;        
        All responses       11     23    29   16    5   2.77   10 
        In chemicals        5      8     5    3    0      1.71    6 
? ? ? ? In machineries        2      9    11   10    4   3.14    1 
? Evaluation for a company's   26     22     27    9    -     9 
   largest sales business    
? Evaluation for a company's   19     16     38    9    -     11 
   future growing business  
Note: no scale 5 (i.e., “very high”) in both questions ? and ?.
Also, respondents were asked about their “general” evaluation on standardization 
effects from their learning and experiences in their tenure (see ? in Table 5). The 
evaluations are widely divided; 34 responses suggest “very low” and “low” effect (scales 
1 & 2), 29 responses the effects of a “medium” level (scale 3), and 21 responses “large”
and “very large” effects (scales 4 & 5). The breakdown by industry of 21 responses with 
higher evaluation is; 2 for fiber & textile, 3 for chemicals, 1 for stone & clay, 1 for steels, 
and 14 for machineries. The finding of diversified distribution is consistent with the 
above results, and also with theoretical prediction referred to earlier.  
    But at the same time, the distribution by industry of responses should be noted, 
since the evaluation, as suggested earlier, may be dependent on the characteristics of 
relevant technologies, and therefore of industries. In fact, in chemicals with vertically 
progressive innovations, there are more responses with lower evaluations (i.e., scales 1 
and 2). On the other hand, in machineries which tend to combine plural technologies, 
relatively more responses support the view of “larger standardization benefits” (i.e.,
scales 4 and 5), although there is a large disperse in evaluation from scale 1 to 5. 
Therefore, in particular in machineries, standardization is very important for 
implementing innovations. 
    Also interestingly, it is noted that the respondents with “high evaluation” 
emphasized the effectiveness of de facto standards and regulatory (therefore, 
compulsory) standards. According to the result, the most effective standard is 14 cases 
for de facto standards, and 17 cases for regulatory standards for the major field (44 
cases), and is 18 cases for de facto standards and 14 cases for regulatory standards for 
the growing field (44 cases). In particular, it is worth noting that regulatory standards 
have a high evaluation. These findings seem to imply reversely that SSO-based 
standardization may have lower evaluation. 
? ? ???????
    Thus, we can conclude that there is a wide variation on the evaluation of 
standardization effects (i.e., from scales 1 to 5), and that many firms have a lower 
evaluation for standardization.  
IV.3  Participation in Standardization: SSOs  
    The second issue is about the motives of joining SSOs(8). SSOs here involve 3 major 
forms. First, there is a “formal” organization which has a government-related 
accreditation or a formal relationship to a government. The typical example is ISO and 
IEC at an international or regional level, and the Japan Standard Association (JSA), 
ANSI (US) and CEN & CENELEC (EU) at a national level. The second is a 
“semi-formal” organization that although it is of an “informal” type in that it has no 
above-mentioned “formally-direct” accreditation or relationship, is usually accredited 
by the national formal organizations. These two types of organizations have a similar 
governance and management structure. Finally, there is an “industry consortium” such 
as patent pool and forum which likewise is “informal” in the above meaning, and is a 
voluntary specialized organization. Most of the consortia also are run on a similar rule 
base to the formal or semi-formal SSOs. In this questionnaire survey, the “formal” 
process means both formal and semi-formal SSOs referred to here, while the “informal” 
processes involve industry consortia. 
Although practically many firms participate in those consensus organizations, the 
organizations are generally provided lower evaluations. Such evaluations may be 
reflected in the motives of joining SSOs. Table 6 describes the results from looking at 
the motives. 
    The most important motive is “Exert an influence on the specification of 
standards”(? in the Table 6) for both formal and informal organizations, though not 
whelming. But, the motive of “Utilize own IPR through standardization” (?) is not 
strong, suggesting that firms don’t prefer to intrude own patents in rivals.  
On the other hand, the reasons related to rivals and other companies have no 
perceived or clear finding; “Prevent rivals’ specification”( ? ), “Observe rivals’ 
technological know-how”(? ), “Increase technological ‘going-ahead’ advantage over 
non-participants”( ? ), “Increase advantage of technological know-how over 
non-participants”(?). It is often said that one of the features of Japanese business 
persons is that they don’t express their intention to outmaneuver or circumvent rivals 
                                                 
(8) SSOs have different classifications, depending on the definition. This study is based on 
Gunawardena [2007]. 
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as social virtue. These findings may reflect such feature. 
Table 6 Motives to Join SSOs 
Motives Rating of Importance 
 Formal SSOs Informal SSOs 
 high medium low high medium low
  3  2  1  3  2  1
? Exert an influence on the 
specification of standards 
29 29 16 25 25 23
? Prevent rivals' specification 15 33 27 22 32 22
? Observe rivals' technological 
know-how 
12 28 35 21 23 24
? Increase technological 
‘going-ahead’ advantage 
over non-participants 
22 22 30 27 23 24
? Increase advantage of 
technological know-how 
over non-participants 
23 23 28  8 22 24
? Reduce R&D expenses  5 33 36  7 31 35
? Improve productivity 10 29 34  6 28 40
? Improve sales 10 22 37  7 28 39
? Reduce transaction costs  2 28 44  3 24 47
? Promote compatibility with 
suppliers of complementary 
products 
 4 28 42  3 29 42
? Ensure legal security on the 
introduction of new technologies 
20 33 22 13 33 29
? Enhance bargaining power 
against suppliers 
11 27 37 9 26 39
? Strengthen the cooperation with 
rivals 
15 36 23 13 37 24
? Utilize own IPR through 
standardization 
14 33 29 17 32 28
    
Next, an interesting finding is that the performance measures of standardization 
effects are not a significant motive. “Reduce R&D expenses”, “Improve productivity”,
“Increase sales”, and “Decrease transaction costs” all are of lower importance as 
participation motive. These results are consistent with lower evaluation of 
standardization effects referred to above. These results may suggest that firms can not 
sufficiently understand the economic mechanism and benefits of standards and the 
strategic relations between standardization and business behavior. 
Third, other reasons also have no clear distribution of response, or have relatively 
lower importance. The following statements may be rather of a higher importance; 
“Ensure legal security concerning the introduction of new technologies” (? ) and 
“Promote the cooperation with rivals” (?).
? ? ???????
    Thus, most of the possible motives for joining SSOs are rather unclear or weak in 
mention. Therefore, firms may not join standardization processes such as SSOs with 
clear strategic objectives. And, there is no large difference in motives between formal 
and informal organizations.  
IV.4  Barriers to Standardization 
    Participation in standardization processes may be affected by restrictive factors, 
which are called “barriers to standardization”. We have to look at what prevents firms 
from participating in the processes actively. Respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of the following ten possible barriers which were related to within-company 
factors and problems facing SSOs: 1) “Lack of awareness by researchers and engineers”,
2) “Inflexible SSOs”, 3) “Very short product cycles”, 4) “High costs of participating in 
standardization process(such as personnel wages and business travel costs)”, 5) 
“Insufficient protection of IP”, 6) “Too many patents impede selection of technologically 
optimal standards”, 7) “Relevant technologies are hold by many different patent 
holders”, 8) “Insufficient communication and coordination between technology and 
standardization-related divisions within a company”, 9) “Insufficient capabilities of 
negotiation (including English language) by experts”, and 10) “Lack of awareness by 
top management about standards”.   
   The result is a little puzzling, since Table 7 shows no discernible pattern on the 
distribution in mention; the most important barriers can not be found from the results. 
Also, when interviews with business managers were conducted before this survey, some 
interviewers suggested that insufficient internal understanding of standardization 
might be a significant barrier. But, the results are beyond the a priori expectation. The 
respondents attached to each factor an “above-medium” level of importance (scales 3, 4 
and 5), implying that these factors may be combined to play some barriers. In 
particular, it is found that the results about SSOs are consistent with the often-cited 
critique that standardization process through a SSO is slow, costly and inflexible. An 
interviewee emphasized that SSO-based standardization is of “a long, complicated and 
burdensome process”. 
It is also noted that these evaluations may depend on the evaluations on 
standardization effects. In other words, these evaluations about the barriers’ 
importance are likely to reflect the finding confirmed earlier that the respondents tend 
to have a relatively low evaluation of standardization effects. The barriers’ evaluation 
may be dependent on the scope of standards as well. 
? ? ???????
                          Table 7 Barriers to Standardization  
        
    Barriers                  ? ? ? ?   Rating of Importance           Mean 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  Very   low   medium   high   very  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  low                            high    
                                1      2       3        4       5  
? Insufficient understanding by         2     15   32    21     3   3.11 
   Researchers & engineers                    
? Inflexible SSOs                      3    12   35    18     4     3.11 
? Very short product cycle               9    20    27     12     5   2.82 
? High costs of standardization      3     7    30     29     4   3.33 
? Insufficient IP protection      4    12      32     23     2     3.10 
? Many patents impede selection of     8    15      25     21     5     3.00 
   technologically optimal standards    
? Relevant technologies are shared      5    10    27     23     9     3.28 
   by many patent holders            
? Insufficient coordination between     4    19    30     15     5     2.97 
   technology and standard divisions 
   within a company                    
? Insufficient capability of negotiation   6    12    31     21     3     3.04 
   of personnel                    
? Lack of awareness by                 6    15    30     21     2     2.97 
   top management                                                                    
    In addition, some respondents indicated their comments on these questions at the 
end of the questionnaire sheet. It was that the “free-riding” problem may have an 
influence on the incentive to participate in standardization process. Similar comments 
were suggested by some interviewers as well.  
In general, the stakeholder firms in SSO-based standardization consist of four 
subtypes: formal core members (sponsors and leaders), formal non-core members 
(observers), implementers (licensees), uninvolved outsiders, and infringers. Figure 3
classifies SSO stakeholders into the four subtypes, following the two criteria of 
“attitude toward standardization process” (“proactive” to “reactive”) and 
“standardization capability” (“high” to “low”). The latter criterion picks up largely the 
holdings of essential patents; Firms with “low” standardization capacity usually have 
no essential patent (i.e., non-holder). The figure also suggests a matrix of SSO 
stakeholders. 
? ? ???????
The possible free-riders consist of two major types: formal non-core members and 
non-members as infringer (IPR ignorer). The former type of free-rider, who is called 
“out-insider” here, joins the consensus process, but do not actively participate in the 
process, and can free-ride on the investment in infrastructure and education & training 
of leading core members (that is, “in-insider” here) at less transaction costs. Also, in an 
earlier stage of market growth, the out-insiders can learn from the in-insiders’ 
successes and failures and gain a competitive advantage by supplying better products 
and services which reflect their learning. 
One interviewee also implied that the “out-insider” problem might be influential in 
standardization processes. The out-insiders may strategically defer the standardization 
process, and gain benefits from production with no standard until the completion. One 
of the out-insiders is a firm engaged in the so-cold “patent-holdup strategy” referred to 
later. Unfortunately the free-riding problem was not included in the questionnaire. The 
problem has not been examined in existing studies as well, but certainly is among the 
crucial problems in economic analysis. Put alternately, the relation between an SSO 
and its members (including potential members as well) should be analyzed. 
IV.5  Evaluation on SSOs’ Governance and Management 
Many companies join SSOs. For example, in growing (strategically most 
important) fields, out of 80 available samples, 47 firms join SSOs, while 33 firms do not 
join. And out of 47 participants, 36 firms are a “formal core member”, and 11 firms a 
“formal non-core member”. 
    Therefore, SSOs’ governance and management may have an influence on 
  Low    Standardization capability   High 
Attitude toward 
standardization 
process 
Proactive
Reactive
In-insider
(core member: 
   leader) 
Out-insider
(non-core member) 
Outsider
Infringer
(outsider)
Implementer
(non-holder:
pure licensee) 
Figure 3  Stakeholders in SSO-based Standardization 
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standardization processes. In other words, how to govern and manage a cooperative 
organization is a big issue, which is usually called “cooperative governance and 
management”(9). Some relevant questions are discussed here. 
?   The respondents in Table 7 provide an “above-medium” or “above-high” level of 
agreement for the statement of “Inflexible SSOs”. Put alternately, SSOs are predicted 
to have no high evaluation as coordination mechanism. In fact, as Table 8 suggests, 
difficult coordination of IPR is a big issue in the governance of SSOs. Also, “Limited 
membership” and “Coordination between an SSO and own company” are an 
“above-medium” level of qualification in standardization process. From the result, a 
delegate from a company is frequently found to face pressure from both his own 
company and SSO. 
Table 8 Governance Problems in SSOs 
         
? ? Problems                      Rating of Importance           Mean 
                          very low  low  medium  high  very high  
                              1   2      3       4      5 
? Coordination of IPRs             5      8     21      28     14 3.57 
? Qualification of membership    4     13     42      15      1 2.95 
? Coordination with own company    5  10     36      21      4 3.12 
Certainly, we have some concrete examples of governance failure(10). For example, 
Covisint (the Connectivity, Visibility, Integration), a US-based SSO for e-commerce of 
automotive parts and components, broke up into two groups due to the conflict of 
interests between major OEMs (assemblers) and suppliers. The OEMs had run the 
SSO, emphasizing largely their own benefits. Also, standardization working of the new 
generation of automotive LAN is deferred in JasPar, a Japan-based SSO for the format 
and an equivalent of Europe’s AUTOSAR. The major reason is the “integral” 
management of the SSO. In fact, the completion of the next generation format has been 
delayed, and is far in the rear of Europe. Therefore, the governance and management 
of SSOs are likely to affect standardization processes. As Doi [2010] emphasizes, the 
structure, behavior and performance of SSOs are a big issue to be examined as one of 
possible determinants of standardization. 
IV.6  Internal System of Standardization 
                                                 
(9) See for example Theurl [2005] for cooperative governance and management from the viewpoint of 
transaction cost theory.
(10) See Doi et al.[2008] and the Nikkei Business Daily, June 12 2009, p.11. 
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    Finally, the participation and effects of standardization may depend on internal 
system of standardization in a company. The system includes both organizational 
structure and manpower.     
The respondents were asked on whether a company had a regular unit (hereafter 
special unit) with full-time responsibility for standardization. Only 29 companies out of 
86 available responses have a special unit. The breakdown is; 2 for textile, 7 for 
chemicals, 16 for machines, and 1 respectively for lubber, steels, metal products, and 
others. Therefore, the result reflects larger technological imperativeness in chemicals 
and machines. On the other hand, 54 out of 57 companies with no special unit replied 
that they would not plan the new starting-up of the unit. Therefore, there are a small 
number of companies with organizational operation and strategy-making in Japan. At 
the same time it should be noted that the introduction of a special unit may be affected 
by company’s product configuration as well. 
The organizational structure at a non-executive level is generally consistent of 
department (the “Bu” in Japanese), section (the “Ka”), and subsection (the “Kakari”). 
Usually there is the following positioning of operational power: Bu > Ka > Kakari in 
power structure. Any one of those units is responsible for standardization works, but a 
company with the “Bu of standardization” is more likely to attach great importance to 
standardization than any other types. Therefore, the perception for importance of 
standardization strategy may be captured through the organizational positioning of 
relevant units in a company.  
Out of 29 companies with special unit, the distribution in mention is 9 companies 
for the Bu type, 13 for the Ka type, and 7 for the Kakari type. The distribution is 
dispersed. And, concerning the organizational relationship between the standard and 
IP units, the former organization is within IP unit in 3 companies, and is independent 
of IP organization in 26 companies. Some progressive companies have a task force for 
strategically promoting standardization. For example, some electronics companies have 
set up the independent and strategic force, of which the role is to formulate 
standardization strategies, and promote internal understanding through education and 
information collection. But, organizational structure may be different among firms, 
depending on product composition and diversification(11).
Also, various studies and knowledge such as technologies, management and law 
                                                 
(11) When looking at organizational structure of major companies, unit for standardization is called as 
various names such as “standard department”, “office of standard strategy”, “standardization & 
collaboration center”, and “standard & partnership department”.
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are necessary as infrastructure for strategy-makings. In other words, qualified 
personnel are essential. But, many companies do not have formal learning and training 
programs for current and potential experts, leaving learning and training to 
standard-related personnel themselves. 
    These findings for internal institutional problems are very likely to reflect the 
weak evaluation of standardization effects found earlier. It is vital to increase the 
understanding and awareness of the standardization benefits. 
V  Results from the Questionnaire: Interaction between IPRs and Standardization 
    The final question is devoted to the link between IPRs and standard managements. 
The standardization process is likely to be related to the IPR management, and in 
particular possible litigation. Recently IPR litigations tend to be decreased(12). The fact 
very likely reflects that cooperation with rivals is dispensable for implementation of 
patents because of patent thicket, although there remains the possibility that major 
firms tend to refrain from applying patents, preferring secrecy to disclosure of new 
inventions. These certainly are both recent discernible trends. 
However, consensus-based standardization does not always mean that there is no 
IPR conflict. Respondents were asked on “whether they experienced in particular 
strong conflicts with their own and others’ IPRs among participants of the 
standardization process”. The results suggest from Table 9 that many companies were 
not involved in strong conflicts in patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. It 
is difficult to say definitely that these results are of an abnormal distribution, but at 
least it may be concluded that many firms prefer peaceful settlements to burdensome 
infringement suits. The fact suggests that IPR coordination is either of a peaceful and 
speedy process or inversely of a “conflict-full” and slow process.   
Table 9 Fierce IPR Conflicts in Standardization Processes     
         
 IPRs                                 Rating of Importance    
        ?     Concerning Own IPRs   ? ?    Concerning Others' IPRs 
           No   Sometimes   Frequently      No   Sometimes   Frequently 
            3    2        1             3       2           1 
?? Patents    64   17        1     58      22           2 
?? Trademarks   78    6        0            77       7           0  
?  Copyrights    78    6        0            78       6           0 
?? Secrecy   78    6        0            79       5           0 
                                                 
(12) The new litigations concerning both patents and utility models during 1999 to 2008 are: 126 cases 
(1999), 133(2000), 108(2001), 129(2002), 141(2003), 143(2004), 125(2005), 102(2006), 124(2007), 
101(2008). See Japan Patent Office’s Annual Report (various years). 
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And, turning to specific contents of conflicts, there are a great number of responses 
who replied that the company had not experienced “Sharp conflicts in FRAND (fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory) conditions of licensing” (69 out of 81 available 
responses), deceptive “hold-up (patent ambush) strategy by rivals” (70 responses), 
“Being filed infringement suits against by others” (51 responses), and “File 
infringement suits against others” (59 responses).? Hold-up may take place in case 
where “a firm improperly induced an SSO to adopt a standard incorporating the firm’s 
IP without properly disclosing that the firm owned these IPRs” (ABA [2004], p.60).  
But, it is worth being noted that 11 (hold-ups) and 12 (licensing conflicts) 
companies have experienced respectively the hold-up and fierce licensing conflict 
problems frequently or sometimes. Those companies are largely in machineries and in 
particular in electrical appliances. For example, the hold-up has been experienced by 5 
firms in electrical appliances, 2 firms in chemicals, and 1 firm respectively in fiber & 
textile, non-ferrous metals, metal products, and transport equipments. 
 Some studies (for example Sidak[2009]) emphasize that hold-up scarcely takes 
place in real-world industries. But, the present results suggest that these strategies 
are not a theoretical artifact in an antitrust model, but are among important practical 
economic issues in public IPR and competition policies. In fact, the possibility of the 
strategies can be found in the Rambus antitrust case in US and EC (2006 to 2009)(13).
Therefore, the contents of the FRAND conditions and holdup strategy should be 
analyzed from the economics viewpoint, which are crucial for IPR antitrust cases. It is 
no wonder to focus on and intensively examine these problems as antitrust issue in 
economic analysis. 
    Next, respondents were asked on “which type out of the following methods is the 
most preferable in IPR coordination in standardization process: Patent pool, Cross 
licensing, Non-assertion agreement of IPRs (which is sometimes called “non-assertion 
covenants (NAC)”), formal SSOs and de facto standardization”. They suggest that 
non–“formal SSOs” methods such as “Patent pool” (28 responses), “Cross licensing” (18 
responses), and “Non-assertion of IPRs” (15 responses) are better than formal SSOs (18 
responses) and de facto standardization with refusal to license (0 response). In 
particular, it is noted that many respondents propose patent pools(14). It may be 
because they think that patent pools are likely to be strategically flexible. Additional 
reason is that leaders with essential patents may restrict “reactive” behavior of 
out-insiders and outsiders through pools. Patent pools are frequently utilized in 
                                                 
(13) See EC [2009], Updegrove [2009] and Suzuki [2010] for the case.
(14) Some patent lawyers frequently indicate that recently Japanese firms are increasingly interested 
in patent pools.
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electronics and software sectors, but pools may be useful for other sectors (such as 
automobile with an increasing number of electronic devices, and biotechnology and 
nanotechnology with possible patent thickets) as well. In this cense, a study of patent 
pools is important. 
This result also is consistent with the above-mentioned finding that the 
respondents see SSOs as less useful for standardization process. In addition, the IPR 
non-assertion is unexpectedly preferred(15). It is important to theoretically and 
empirically examine the choice of governance structures in standardization and patent 
coordination, and their respective economic effects. 
    Finally, IPR coordination is frequently very difficult in formal standardization 
process as well. In those cases, alternative solutions have been proposed; for example, 
“compulsory licensing” and “relaxed conditions of patenting” (such as reduced terms). 
The importance of these institutional solutions was asked. These measures, as 
suggested in Table 10, do not display remarkable cluster of responses, but both gain an 
“above-medium” level (scales 3, 4 and 5) of agreement. The latter (70 out of 78 available 
responses: 90%) is rather more preferable than the former (54 out of 77 available 
responses: 70%).  
Table 10 Alternative Solutions for Patent ConflictsGovernance Problems in SSOs 
?   Solutions                Rating of Importance?                  Mean 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?     very   low    medium   high   very  
                                    low                             high 
1   2       3   4       5  
? Compulsory licensing             7  16  28  21       5 3.01 
? Relaxed conditions of patenting    3   5      35  29       6 3.38 
However, if scales 4 (“high”) and 5 (“very high”) capture the evaluation of an 
adequate solution, there is a rather divided evaluation for the compulsory licensing; 
respondents (23 persons with scales 1 and 2) who don’t support it are responsible for 
roughly 30%. Therefore, many respondents take a skeptical view of the measure. On 
the other hand, more respondents support the relaxation of patenting conditions. Thus, 
many firms may prefer voluntary or informal solutions to institutional or compulsory 
measures, being skeptical of public interventions. 
VI  Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
(15) NAC is explained in Bekkers et al.[2006].
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    To examine the relationships of standardization to technology, IPR and competition 
policies, it is necessary to empirically analyze and understand the standard behavior of 
firms. This paper has taken the questionnaire survey, and provided the uni-variate 
distributions of responses for various questions. The approach frequently does not lead 
to sensible results, but we believe that the findings here roughly portray a picture of 
standardization strategy-makings among Japanese firms. Some major features from 
the questionnaire survey are summarized as follows.  
    (1) In general, it is said that Japanese firms less actively involve in the 
standardization process. But, they have a larger perception and understanding of the 
importance of standardization.? This finding is in contrast with unsuccessful activities 
of Japanese industries in global standardization processes, which are frequently 
suggested by some case studies. The discrepancy may have an implication. 
    (2) Recognizing that product innovation and improvement are overwhelmingly 
important in strategy, firms have stronger preference for patents, trademarks, secrecy 
and lead-time advantages than for other measures as protection tools of invented 
technologies. 
    (3) The important motives emphasized of patent application are: avoiding rivals’ 
imitations, increasing own company’s value, preventing infringement litigations, and 
impeding rivals’ patenting strategies. But, the paten and licensing strategies were 
frequently estimated to be of a medium and less level of success.  
    (4) There is a diversified evaluation on standardization benefits, depending on 
technological characteristics of industry and other possible factors. Also, many 
companies feel a little doubtful of the large benefits of standardization. The lower 
evaluation may be related to the assessment that standardization through SSOs has 
not always sufficient effect.. 
    (5) The important motives of joining SSOs are: exerting an influence on the 
specification of standards. It is noted that the factors picking up the relations with 
rivals, and also the performance-based measures of standard effects are not a 
significant one.  
    (6) Although many firms join SSOs, their evaluations are rather of a low rating, 
implying that SSOs do not function effectively as coordination mechanism.  
    (7) There is not always sufficient system of organization and manpower for 
promoting standardization in many firms. 
    (8) Many companies tend to think that they would like to avoid litigation suits in 
standardization process. One of the solutions for patent conflicts is coordination 
? ? ???????
through SSOs. But, the evaluation for in particular formal SSOs’ workings is 
frequently low. For that reason, many respondents have a larger preference for patent 
pool (a voluntary, informal SSO) and cross licensing (non-“industry-wide consensus” 
strategy) when coordination is possible. Their views are divergent on the effectiveness 
of two possible institutional proposals such as compulsory licensing and relaxed 
conditions of patenting, when coordination is very difficult. 
We have no satisfactory theory and evidence of standardization. The present 
empirical research may help to delineate the major features of standard strategy in 
Japanese firms, which in turn are likely to lead to the theoretical development of 
standardization economics. Such “question-begging” approach is likely to be useful. 
The economic analyses of standards have in particular two major significances. 
First, as suggested earlier, technology standardization has played large role, and is 
currently playing much more important role in industrial activities. Second, in general 
a market economy includes “cooperative” coordination mechanism as well as 
competitive mechanism. As this paper emphasizes, consensus standards are among the 
cooperative mechanism, and have major influences on economic activity. Therefore, 
consensus standardization should be examined as one of important, but open, economic 
problems. The present paper is the first step. 
However, there remain some problems to be examined. The results may not 
capture firms' opinions sufficiently, since the response rate is not high, and the results 
are mostly indicative. Also, the study did not examine the relationships between the 
results for various questions. In addition, the contents of the questions were limited; 
the questions did not include some un-negligible factors such as free-riding and 
antitrust policy(16). Not analyzed were the relationships of the characteristics derived 
from the questionnaire to the quantifiable factors like R&D measures and financial 
performance, and further to market structure of industries firms (and respondents) 
inhabit. Finally, the functioning of SSOs remains open problem(17). The examinations of 
these problems are left to additional papers. 
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